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IHTEODUCTIONs ihe scope of the present "brief and certain
findings of the IMT.
The purpose of t.ie present brief is to analyze the
evidence connecting the defendant ICarl E i t t e r with
Count III of the indictment« The charge under this count
<
is thus generally described in paragraph 27 of the
indictment;
"The"defendants Weizsaeckery Steengracht/E^i t t e r, Woermann, Erdmannsdorff, Xjammers,
Dietrich, and Berger, with divers other .persons,
during the period from September 1939 io May 1945?
committed War Crimes, as defined in Article II of
^ Control Council Lav; No^ 10, in tha.t they partici
pated in atrocities and offenses a.gainst prisoners
of war and nembers of the armed forces of nations
then at war vjith the Third Eeich or under the belli—
gerent control of, or military oGcapa.tion by
* C-ermany, including murder, ill treatment, enslave-
) ment, brutalities, cruelties, and other inhumane
acts e prisoners of war a.nd belligerents v^ere
starved, lynched, branded, shackled,- tortured and
nurdered in'flagra,nt violation of the lava's and cus-
"toms of war, and through diplomatic" distortion,
denial a.nd fabricated justification, the perpetra
tion of these offenses a.nd atrocities was concea,led
from the protective powers. The defendants committed
Wax Grimes in that they vjere principals in, accesso
ries to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in,
were connected v;ith plans and enterprises involving,
and were members of organizations and groups connect
ed with, the comniission of IVa.r Crimes."4
In paragraph 28 of the indictment, this general accu-
sation is illustrated, though not exhaustively covered,
Dy five concrete charges respectively described in subdi
visions a—e of that para.graph. The defendant R i t t e r
is named in four of themp He is thus, in addition to the
general a.ccusation under parngrapti 27, specifically
charged with criminal participation in the lynching nnd
«he "special treatment" of Americm.n a.nd Allied flie^^s
(subdivision a), the sla.ughtering a.iid "special treatment
of members of Allied Commando units (subdivision b), the
so-called Sagan incident consisting in the murder of about
50 officers of the British Eoyal Air Eorce who had escaped
- 1
from Stalag lof't; m (sabdivision c) and the morder of the
^French General Mesny who was zi prisoner of war in German
Gustody (sa"bdivlsion d)»
OrdinanoG ho»7 (Military Government—Germany, 03:ga—
niaation and Pov;ers of certain Milita.ry Tribunals) j con
tains in its Article X. the following provision;
"The determinations of the Internationa.l
Military Tribunal in the judgment in Case No, 1
that invasionsj a.ggressive acts, aggressive v/a.rs,
crimes j avtrocitics or inhuma.ne a.ots were planned
or occurred, shall be binding on the Tribunals
established hereunder and shall not be questioned
except insofar as the participation" thereip. or
knowledge" thereof by any particular person ma„y be
concerned^ Statements of the International Mili
tary Tribunal in the judgment in Case No. 1 con
stitute proof of the facts stated, in the absence
of substantia.1 new evidence to the contrary."
In view of the thus esta.blished stare decisis
effect of certain findings of the IMT, the following
quotations from Section Vl/A of its opinion and judgment
are herewith quoted for judicial knowledge«
Under the main heading "War Crimes and Crimes
Aga.inst Humanity" and the subheading "Murder and 111—
Treatment of Prisoners of War", the IMT has found;
"In the course of the war, many Allied sol
diers who ha.d surrendered to the Germans were shot
immediatolyoften as a matter of deliberate, ca-1—
culated policy^ On the 18th October 1942, the
defendant Keitel circulated a directive authorized
by Hitler, which ordered that all members of
Allied 'commando^ units, often when in uniform and
whether c-rmed or not, were to be 'slaughtered to
the la.st man, ' even if they a.ttempted to surrender.
It was further provided that if such Allied troops
came into the hands of the military authorities
after being first captured by the local police, or
in any other v/ay, they should be handed over imme
diately to the SDo This order was supplemented
from time to timey and was effective throughout ^
the remainder of the war, although after the Allied
landings in Normandy in 1944 it was made clear that
the order did not apply to 'commandos' captured
within the immediate battle area. Under the provi
sions Gf this order, Allied 'commando' troops, and
other military units operating independently, lost
their lives in Norway. Prance, Czechoslovakia, and
Italy, Many of them wer® killed on the spot, and
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in no oase were those who were executed later in
ooncentro.tion co.aps ever given a trial of any
hind« , ♦ , .
"In March 1944? 50 officers of the British
Royal Air Borcey who escaped from the cacip at Sa,gan
where they were confined as prisoners ^ Vv'ere shot on
recapture, on the direct orders of Hitler^ Their
"bodies were imriedia.tely creniatedy and the urns con
taining their a.shes were returned' to the campo It
v/as not contended "by the defendants that this was
other than pla.in murder 5 in cocaplete violation of
international lav7«
"TThen Allied airmen were forced to land in
G-ermany they v;ere sometimes killed at once "by the
civilian population^ The police were instructed
not to interfere v^ith these killings, and the
Ministry of Justice was informed that no one should
he prosecuted for taking part in theniB" (TriaA of
the Ma.jor War CriEiii^a.ls before the lnternationa.1
Military Tribunal, Nuznberg 1947? pp.228,229)»
It will be seen from the foregoing portions of the
IMT judgment tha.t they cover, though in a different se
quence, the same ground with charges raised in the present
indictment, under Count III, paragraph 28, suhdivisions
i-c.
In addition to its just quoted general findings,
the IMT mOvde pertinent findings a.lso with regard to speci
fic defendantSfl
For instance, the IMT findings concerning Von
Rihbentrop include the following ones on Allied fliers a.nd
the murder of the French Generals
"Von Rihbentrop partioipa.ted in a, meeting ofJune 6, 1944, at which it v^a.s a,greed to start a pro
gram under which Allied avia.tors carrying
chine-gun atta,cks on civilia-n population should e
lynched^ In Beoember, 1944? von Ribbentrop was in
formed of the plains to murder one of the French
generals held as a prisoner of war and directed hi-
subordinates to see that the details were workea
out in such a wr,y a.s to prevent its detection by
"the protecting powers c" (Op. cit ..page 287)-
The IMT findings concerning Kextel include the fol«^
lowing one on the murder of Allied Commandos;
- 3
"V/a.T cxines and crimes a.gr,inst humanity
On 4 August 1942y Keitel issued a directive thG,t
paratroopers vjere to be turned over to the She On
18 October Hitler issued the conmando. order vjhich
was carried out in several insta,nces« After the '
landing in Normandyj Keitcl re-affirmed the orderj
and later extended it to Allied missions fighting
v;ith pa.rtisans. He admits he did not believe the
Older was legal, but elaims he could not stop
Hitler from decreeing it," (Op«ait^page 289)-
ihe IMT findings concerning Kaltenbrunner include
the following ones on the execution of Commando Troops,
Allied fliers a,nd the murder of the French Generals
"huring the period in v;hich Kaltenbrunner
^ wa.s hea.d of the ESHA; it v;as engaged in a v/ide-
spread program of yjc.x crimes and crimes against
humanity, The order for the execution of
commando troops v;as extended by the Gestapo to in
clude parachutists while Ka.ltenbrunner was chief of
* the RSHA, An order signed by Kaltenbrunner in—
f etructed the police not to interfere with attc.cks
on bailed out Allied fliersIn hecember 1944?
Kaltenbrunner participated in the murder of one of
the French generals held as a prisoner of war.^"
(0PcCit»page292)r
The IMT findings concerning Jodl include the fol
lowing one on the Commando Order;
'T/ar crimes and crimes a.gahnst humanityOn
4- 18 October 1942^ Hitler issued the comma-ndo order
and a da^y later a, supplementary explanation to com-
majiding officers onlyr^ The covering memorandum was
signed by Jodl, Early drafts of the order were
made by Jodl's staff, with hie Icnowledgec Jodl
testified he was strongly opposed on moral and
legal grounds, but could not refuse to pass it on^
He insists he tried to mitigate its ha^rehness in
practice by not informing Hitler when it was no
carried out. He initialed the 0IC7 niemorandum o
25 June 1944; re-affirming the order after tne
f Hormandy landings o"' (Op ccit ^pa.ge 324) =
P' • Finally, tho IMT findings on Bornann, include this
one on the lynching of Allied fliers^
"Bormann is responsible for
Allied airmen,. On 30 Ma^y 1944? ^9 ner-
police action or criminal proceedings
sons who had taken part in the lynching of A
fliers. This was accompanied by a. Goebbels
propaganda campaign inciting the German poop
take action of this nature and the conference oi
6 June 1944? where regulations for^the appXication
of lynching v\fere discussed," (Oi3 ocit .page 340) >
^ 4 -
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r'i
The recent JadgQent in the so-cclled Eigh Oornmand
OcisGj or Or.se E06'12 (United Stntos of Acierica vsr. V/ilhela
von IiGGh, et a.1)^ contains at soTsral places elahorate
discussions of the gGnercl facts to which the specific
charges against the defendant E i t t e r under Ocsint
III are relatedj so for instance in the followjug'pox-tici-ns
of the findings against the defenda.nt Vfolter Warlinionts
''The Gonnando Order", pages 287, et seq.; "Murder and "
of Enemy Belligerents and prisoners of War";
pages 299 et soq.
5 ^
;.,V
I'.a. '
1X• E I T T E B. ^ S Grininal Aotivities under Coant III»
By the above q.aotatj.ons fron the xmt .judgoienty v?a
"oellGve to have safficiently described the general bach—
ground of those charges against the defendant which are
to be discussed in the present brief. It is not neces-
sa.ry to describe here Anbassador E i t t e x 's career
and general place within the regine of the Third Eeich,
since this is covered in the Prosecution's brief on
E i t t e r concerning Counts I and II.
Eeferring to his personal data it should only be
repeated that Hitter v;as the liaison-diplomat bet—
f ween von Eibbentrop a.nd his State Secrctrrics von
V/oissaeoker and von Steengracht on the one side, and
ICeitel, Jodl and Y/arlimont of the OKW on the oth.er side.
Hitter was in change of coordinating diplomatic and
military actions. Therefore, he is specifically connect
ed with aotivities charged under Count III.
Pirst WG will show Hitter 's pantici:pation
in the program to murder Allied fliers,, coamando units,
escaped prisoners of war, and a French General.
In the second pant of the brief we will disonss
the a.pplicable law.
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ity be sufficient to show the close connection -pf thee defend-
• Sitter ' ^ -pr-rticiprtion in estr.blish-ing the IvnGh
law prr.ctlcG ggcingt coutured enepy fliers.
The defendant R I T T E R partlcipaticri in as-
tcbliahing the policy of lynch murder of Allied fliers ho,s
"been proven beyond reasonc.ble doubt. This partioalar fcap
ture of the Gernan atrocity practice wrs directed against
captured Anierica,n or Allied fliers. Under the flimsy pre
text of having committed war crimes by combat actions^
they were^ brutally sla.ughtered either by exposure to offi
cially sponsored lynching acts of Ggrman civilians or by
wa,y of so-callod "special treatment," v^ithout even the
semblance of a judicial procedure. A few documents will
a,nt Hitter with these criminal acts.
Me start with prosecution's Exhibit 1233. (PS-730,
Doc.Book 41, E.pr, 21), v/hich is part of a oorresp ondonce
between R i t t e r, in his capaoity a.s Ribbentrop's "top
liaison iman with Keitel, and the Army High CcDman-d. This
document is a letter of 15 June 1944, showing the initials
of Keitel, Uarlimont ajrd one poleck (Chief Quartern^aeter),
re "tre'-laent of enemy terror aviators", addressed io tiho
"foreign. Office, attention; Ambassador R i t t c T, Salz—
.. tlispatchod according to a handwritten note on the
^^orning of June 17th. It clearly reveals that the allega-'
iion of war crimes committed by enemy fliers should only
n preetext for the a.ttempt to discourage, by brutal and
03:iminah terror, the onGny's use of the Air Porces. It
Gontaine- an announoemerLt of certain planned rules for the
carrying out of the alrocity, combined with the request
that the Porelgn Office should, if possible, state its
ngreement by the 18th of June, The full main text of the
letter ^e^^,dg^
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"Fox tliG publio.Gtion of such cr.ses ns hr.ve
led to lynch Jastice being tr.ken by the popnlntion
or —in the or.so of crptuxe by the nmed forces ©r
the police - to Special Trortaent by the SD, it is
neoesso.ry to detexnine clocxly whet fccts shoald be
xegcrded ns evidence of a cxinincl cctj.on in this
sense,
"In agxeenent with Ob, d. L,, I intend to os-
teblish the following definition." It nay also serve
as instruction to the connander of the reception
Oanp for aviators at Obcruxsol in these ©o.ses, v7horc
investigation in that canp shows that it would be
indicated to separate the offender, owing to con-"
firmation of the suspicion, or to hand him over to
the SI),
1) Strafing civilians either individuals or crowds-
* 2) Firing on our own (G-ernan) a.ir crews while sus
pended in pa.xaohutes after having been shot
dovmi
f 3) Strafing regular passenger trains;
4") Strafing military hospitals, hospitals and_
hospital tra.ins which a.rc clearly ma,rlced with
the Eed Gross,
"Prior to publication of any such case In
the press j over the radio, etc,, it must bic ascer-
ta.ined that name, unit, place of oceurrence , and
other relevant particulars form a eonvincingT pic—
"tare, by whose publication the intended deterrent
e:ffect from further acts of murder could be
achieved, in drafting the publication, lb will
hiave to be borne in mind that -oxotests on the part
I; o-f the enemy axo to be expected fxom all q.uaxters.
It is thexefoxe intended, in agreement with "tbcChief of the Seouxity Folice and the SI) and with
the d. L,, that pxiox to each publifiation,
until fuxthex notice, agxeenent should be xe-. cn*^a
- ^ between the &K1 the \7Gst, the Foxoignhhe SD, to decide on the*facts, timB and form oi
^ "hhe announcecientK
"1 would ask you to confixm, if P^^^^inent^
t:he ISth of this month, that you axe in agxec?ci
vsith tho above definition and v/ith the intendc pro—
ciedure fox the announcementst"
TOhcre follows, in the chxonological sequence of
events, Exhibit 1234 Foc.E, 4I7 E.p....23)y a, file
note, 'of 1,8 ju.ne I944, initialed by the aforementioned
Ghio:^ Quartermaster, Col« Foleok, and another mecuber of
tbG same Army organization. It thus renders the contents
of a phone conversation with R i t t e x on the subject
"treatmemt of Anglo—Anorloan terror pilots", which tooic
} caa'riee the following heading:
plrioe at 1745 of that dayj
"Ilinlster Hitter inforned ne, tha,t the
opinion of the Horoign Office cannot oc ciade known
"before tomorrow night, since ho himself had ij^on
aoq_ua.inted with the fact only yesterday afternoon
and will have to check hack with-Berlin;"
Wo next turn to the document vi'hich is the most in—
pcrta.nt In the present oormection, tha-t is Prosecution's
Exhibit 1235, (R-118, Doc,Book 41, E.p, 24), a top secret
letter, dated 25 June 1944, signed hy E i t t e r,
addressed to the aforementioned Col. poleck, who received
it on 26 June on which day it was also initialed hy
Warlimont, Thie letter of R i t t e r reads:
"With reference to toda.y's telephone convor—
sat ion I herewith transmit for your preliminary
information the draft of a reply to the Chief of
the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces in a.ns\ver
to his'letter of 15 June - Noi WEST/Qu/ (Verw,)
Ro. 771795/44 gKOhcfs. 11 Aug. The draft has heen
submitted to the Reioh Foreign Minister. Since
the Reich Foreign Minister is away on travel for
several days, he was not able as yet to gave his
a.pproval to the draft, i must, therefore, reserve
"bhe possibility of making cha.nges."
'The draft, mentioned in this carrying note, of the
Foreign Office's intended but not yet approved reply to
the requ.est of the Army High Command of 15 June 1944
(hcroinaabove, Exhibit 1253, 728-PS, Doc.B. 41, E.p. 25)?
'"'Ambassador R i t t e r Ho. 444 Salsburg.
2© June 1944,"
"--nd has at the bottom a, typewritton but croeeed out sig*"
nature Ijy R i t t c r. Its text is highly significant of
l^oreign Office's full awareness of the flagra.nt vlolff-
tions of intcrnatiorla.l law involved in the intended schomc
diuscrlbed by the Army High Oomnand in its letter of 15
June 1944 and the determined intention, neverthel oss, of
the Foreign Office to approve this practice, elaborate it
-9—
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for the purpose of giving high efficionoy to its terror
effect and cooperate with it by pseudo-legal covering up
thereof.- This nost shocking text reads;
"1.) To Chief of the Suprotie Conciand of the Artaed
Forces with reference to your correspondence
of 15 June 1944 Nr. V/T'ST/Qu. (Verw.) Nx.
771793/44 gEChefs. II. Aug., concerning the
treatment of enerny terror-a-viators.
"In spite of the obvious objections,^founded
on international law and foreign ^
Foreign Office is basically in agreeaent with in
proposed aea.sures •
"In the examination of the individual "^hses
a distinction niust be node between the oases ot
lynching and the cases of special tree btient by
S.D. (security Service).
"X- In the cases of l3'"nching, the p^recise
establishment of the cirouasta.noes deserving
iahment, according to points 1-4 of the cammuni
tion of 15 June, is not very essential,
the German authorities are not directly -1
since death had occurred, before a German oi -
became concerned with the case^ Furxheraone,
accompanying circumstances will be such, T
v^fill not be difficult to depict the case in ^n^
appropriate manner upon_publication. 'ortanco
cases of lynching, it will be of primany -P
correctly to handle the individual case upon P
cation,
"II. The suggested proooduro for ®
trertneiit by the S.D. (Security Servic_^ ) ' i£
subseguont puyicntion, would oe tenrtle,
Gefmany, on this occasion simultaneously
openly repudiate the commitment rocog-
rnternational law, presently in rorce, seized
niized by Germany. To'delivc:rbd to
boy the Army or by the PoUoe, and is ho
t:he Air Forces (F •J-) Reception mp 0 ^P.W. -_n 3^ g-d;-tus
Mas received, by this vep War Tr^^
o.f a prisoner of war. The rules on ilieO.f 27 July 1929 estyiishes
porosecution and scntonoing of ns for
aand the Execution of the
cexample in Article 66; De-th ' protestive
cearried out only three raonths ai g. in Article
poower has been notified of the _senxc -
6«3; a, prisoner of wax will be nemibers of
individual inciaem.. this occasion
t:he Foreign office cannot reconmena ^ Treaty.
OA forma,! repudia.tion of the prisone
- 10 -
c 01 n uc;
ctourts and under the same procodur spsci-
t-he German Armed Forces. These up any
f ic, that it would be futile to try publica—
v-iolation of them by clever wording other hand,
t:ion of an dent, on - c
"An emergency solution would be to prevent
suspected fliers frora ever attaining'r. legal priso
ner of \h.T status, that is, that iciniediately upon
seizure they be told that they"are not oonsxdered
prisoners of Vvar but criainals, that they^would no
be turned over to the agencies having ;Jurisdictioh
over prisoners of War; hence not go to^a prisonco.
of War Ca.cip; but that they would be delivered to
the authorities in charge of the prosecution ox
criminal acts and that they would be tried in a
summary proceeding. If the evidence at the trial
should reveal that the special procedure is not
applicable to a particular case, the fliers con
cerned may subsequently bo given the^status of
prisoner of War by transfer to the Air Forces(P.W.) Eeception Camp Oberursel. lT--tarally, not
ev©n this expedient will prevent the possibili y
that Germany will be accused of the violation ox.
existing treaties and maybe not even the a.doption
of reprisals upon German prisoners of war* A
any rate this solution would ena^ble us clearly o
define our attitude, thus relieving us of the
necessity of openly halving to renounce the prcv^en^
agreements or of the need of having to usq excu^Ck,^^
which no one would believe, upon the publication ox
ea.ch individual case.
"Of the acts deemed crimes listed under 1-4
by the letter of 15 June, wc note that those lxs_-
ed under 1 and 4 are legally unobjectionable.
Those under 2 and 3 are not. The Foreign_Oifice,
however, would be willing to disreg-rd this. Foi-
haps it would be preferable to combine Nos.
a.nd 4 to the effect that all strafing -ttach.
the civilia,n population by an aviator will
^ ^ . ^1 _ • n
on
aea.lt with as crimes. The various facts under 1.!pG-3 , and 4 would then be significant only ^
csially outstanding ex-nples. .The foreign Qrii
siees no reason Vi/hy such a.ttaxhs should no •
plated, when they are directed against the
c^n population in ordinary dwelling houses,
civili'-
in
-utom.obiles^ on riverbo':^ts, etc*
"The Foreign Office bases its opinion
t that it is altogether forbidden to Ger.m--^^
to strafe the civilian nopulation
ttachs in England. According to in-formai^i-
d "by the Foreign off ice, such an order
some time ago by the Supreme Comman.der
Porccs- in case of general
stencG of such an order could be poan-nca
the fa.c
filers
timelr a
roGccivG
i-SsuGd
"the Air
exi
out.
"III. It follows froD tho obove,
noin wGiglit of the cction will put
lynohlngs. Should the c'-npoign be oprxed ou
•^•0 such on extent th"t the purpose, to v;ix.
d.eterxonce of eneny oviotors' ptm
O-chlevod. vDhnoh ffno.l iP fo.vored by the jtorexgi
wa^
of
the
^•the
y wnicn go<-x '• r-iTr "PiipT"
Office, then tho str.cfing attnoks by .1oxien xn s ^ .-,4-v.aGC!pf^ in
^Pon tbxG civilian populations must be —
c- c^omplGtely different propagandist
herretofore' if not in the publicity for home
Eura.ption, then certainly in the propaganda
^irrected to foreign countries. The pertinent
11 -
V xlH-i
rG-ernan local departnents, nost likely the police,
would have to bo informed inmedirtely to submit
a shoxtj truthful report to a, central depository
in Berlin giving particulars as to place, time,
number of dead and wounded.
"Ihis central depository would at once for—
wa.rd those ieports to Boreign Office for esploita—
tion. Since similar strafing attacks upon Civili
an populations have occurred in other countries,
for exakdple, in Brance, Belgium, Croatia and
Rumania,, the pertinent Gorman departments or the
governments in these countries are to be directed
to collect the instances of such strafing a.ttacks
against the civilian population in the same
manner a,nd to exploit them propagandistically in
foreign"countries, in collaboration with German
offices.
IV In the letter of 15 June the intention
v/as communicated th'^t until further notice, an
understanding with the Boreign Office would have
to be reached prior to any publicationo The
Boreign Office a,ttaches particular v'~lue to this
point- and also to the f^^ct that this understanding
be reachednot only until further nctice, but
for the entire duration of the campaign."
Particular attention should be called to the fact
that the abovoquoted draft of the Boreign Office's answer-
in part of its section II expressly states that tv^o types
of enemy a.otion, to bo considered as v;ar crimes according
to the Army High Command's letter of 15 June 1944, a.re
legally unobjectionable in the opinion of the Boreign
Office but tlia.t "the Boreign Office, however, would be
willing to disregard this". Most revealing is also the
passage in III of tho draft that "the main weight of the
a.ction will have to be placed on lynchings".
That the just quoted draft W"S subsequently appro
ved by Ribbentrop and that R i t t e r was the one who
notifiod the High Command of this approval, making the
draft a definite statement of the position of the Boreign^
Office, appears from Exhibit 1237 (PS-740> Boo.B. 41, E»p»
28), a memorandum dated 30 June 1944, from Warlimont to
Keitel, signed by the first one and initialed by the
- 12 -
"i'.!
fsecond one and which in part reads:
"Enclosed I submit the draft of a reply of
the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Chief of
the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, which has
been passed to the Armed Forces Ops Staff (WFSt)
through Ambassador Hitter, Ambassador
Hitter ha,s '^dvised us hy telephone on 29
June that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has
approved this draft, but that ho has ordered
Envoy Sonnleitncr to present the attitude of the
Foreign Office to the Fuehrer, before the letter
is sent to the Chief of the Supreae Command of
the Armed Forces« The letter is to be forwarded
to the Chief of the Supreme Comaand of the Armed
Forces only a.ftor the a.pprova.1 by the Fuehrer of
the principles established by the Foreign Office."
Hitter Eefense
It is not necessary, for the present purpose, to
fully cover the story which the defendant told during
his direct testimony (Transcript pages 11963-11969) with
regard to the documents just quoted in order to color the
events in c. manner more favorable to him. For, even
taken at its face value, in spite of the strong smell of
fiction emanating therefrom, it docs not clear the defen
dant from the criminc-l guilt v/ith which he burdened him
self by expres'sing consent, on behalf of Ribbentrop, and
"by promoting through suggestions, also on behalf of
Hiboentrop, the atrocious scheme of the Army EigbL Comaand
Reducing Hitter 's story to its essential
elements, he denies by allegations highly incredible in
their particulars, that he himself was the author of the
aforenentionod draft but rather claims that it was
Hibbentrop's draft on which the latter still wanted to
put the final touches but which he novortholass already
handed to r i -t ^ g relates that, v/hiin the
T/ehrma.cht becarie impatient Cvbout not having, Hibbontrop's
definite answer, he (Hitter) on his owm initiative
^ 13 -
grcvnted its request to lio.ve c. oo'py of this drr.ft even
"beforo its approvr.l by Eibbcntrop; that Hitter's
secretary, in aisunderstanding his intention, typed the
draft ap as a.n origina.l to be signed by hin; a.nd that he
corrected this aistakc by crossing out the typev/rittcn
signa:tu.re at the end before he turned over the draft-cc-oy
to the officer v;aiting for it«
Even if this be true, it shows clearly that
E i t t e r not only consented to a,nd on his side coopcra-r
ted with Eibbentrop's obvious intention to approve the
J-J atrocious schene of the Wehraa.cht and inprove its effici
ency by certain suggestions, but that Hitter even
^ went beyond the scope of his duties r,s Eibbentrop's sub-
ordinate by on his own initiative turning over to the
Welirnaoht a not yet approved draft of Eibbentrop's r.nswcr
and thereby and by his acconpanying letter intinating his
expectation tha.t in gcnor."! Eibbentrop's final position
would be in accordance with this draft.
That, however, Hitter 's story deviates froa
I the truth is illustrated by his a,llega.tion that Ribbentrop
* himself had na.do the draft while his abovequoted letter of
25 June 1944, Exh. 1255, expressly st-^tess "The draft has
1^ been subuittod to the Eeich Foreign ilinister" and thus
clearly shows that it was not a dr-"ft originating frca
Eibbentrop.
That R i t t G r from the beginning of the campaign
for the lynching of enemy fliers had contemporane ous 3cnow-^
lodge of that a.trooivpus policy, that he immediately con
sidered it as criminal and that in this matter he alro"dy
in May 1944, that is weeks before the aforomentloned
correspondence, had personal contacts with the Army High
- 14
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Conincind, r.pper.rs fron his following own a.ccount:
"I visited Jodl on the 28th of Mr.y in
Bexchtosgnden concorning another natter, When our
talk was over we walked a distance together, a.nd
Jodl asked nG,,*HavG you seen Goebbels' a.rtiole
on the oneny air terror?^ I said that I hadn't
finished it, but that I had it in ny pocket and
was in the process of reading it when I visited
hid (jodl). A brief conversa,tion ensued on this?
and Jodl naned a couple of cases in which eneny
fliers had shot at G-ornan civilians. He also nen—
tioned cases in which parachuting Gc^^aan pilots
were shot by oncny planes v/hilc descending. Jodl
was very nuch perturbed by 'Goobbels' article, and
he said that this v^^s a r^^.thcr .uniDle'^sant act of
initiative on Goebbels' part and that it vjould bo
difficult to avoid repercussions. Then, I said
to hin, 'If this article of Goebbels has serious
consequoncos, then you should ask a. lawyer about
I" it. I aysclf can tell you nothing.' But I
agreed v/ith hire that this initiative on Goebbels'
part was highly unfortunate.," (Transcript pages
11963, 11964)».
Moreover, early contacts of the aboveacntioned
kind between Arny High Cociaand and Hitter are inti—
nated in a. docuxiont of A Juno 1.944 entitled "tre^tncnt of
the eneny terror aviators", Exhibit 1231 (PS-737, Boc.B.
41, E.p, 16), being top secret conferonce notes by the
!. '^"^orcnenticncd Col. Polook, initialed by Wr^rlinont. This
document which deals with the natter indicated in the
o-bovequotod title contains the following paragraph 5
which specifically refers to H i t t e r and indicates
the knowledge assigned to the Foreign Office in the whole
P2:ogran;
"In accordance with the instructions issuedin the evening of 3 Juno, by the Chief of the
CociDand Staff of the Arned Forces, the foreign
Office is to bo infornod of the situation in the
evening with the following purposes in views
a) That the fornul-^tion of the noizxoQS of
the Reich Fuehrer SS and the other ncasurois s^houia
undertaken in an appropriate manner and- in
^ '^Ccord with the Foreign Office; and
. ^ b) To be prepared in advance against Pjo-
^csts by the arav powers, so afi to be in a poS'i-
txon to answer them iamediatcly, and thus to pr(5-
vent oGcurxencos such as those which took place
^ 15 -
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^ Similar is his defense with regard to Exhibit 1228,
in conrLGction with the esor..pG of tho Anglo-
Aaericr-n nvin.tors fron Ccrip Sr-gcin.
Anibc-ssr^dor R i t t e r ha.s been nlxendy
notified accordingly by the Chief cf the Connnnd
Staff of the Araed Forces •"
Uevertholess the defendant olnias that he had no
further conversrticnE in this actter after the one already
nentioned with Jo^il on 28 May 1944-, the day of the publi
cation of Goebbels' infaaous article in the Voelkischor
Beoba.chter, encouraging the lynching of captured encny
fliers by the civilian population (Transcript pages
11971), and that he was therefore surprised about the
Aray High Coaaand's letter of ,15 June 1944 (Transcript
page 11970).
FS-3780, Doc.Book 21, E.p.12. This is a record of
Hitler's oonforenoG with the Japanese Anbass^dor Oshima,
in the presence of Ribbcntrop and Sonnloithner (of
Eibbcntrop's personal staff), signed by the latter. Tho
conference took plane at Hitler's Borghof, on the 27
May 1944, and the record contains this passage:
"Tho Fuehrer advised Cshina ,th"t the
Japanese should hang - not shoot - every
American terror pilot (Terrorflicger); then
the Americans would think it over before
making such attacks."
On the distribution list there appears "Ambassador
E 1 t t e r",. in rdditicn to the Eoicii Foreign Minister
end two other dietributicne. Nevertholess,. the dofondi,jat
denies oontenporoneoue knowledgo of the docanont. (Tr.,n
script, prge 11973). Bo this c.a it noy, ovon without
Exhibit 1228, Hitter is so clo-rly end definitely
linlced with the Foreign Offico -s prrticip-tion in the tor.
ror practice ngoinst onptured eneny fliers thrt his guilt
- 16 -
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Iconcerning this feature of Count III r.pporrs proved beyond
c.ny roasonnblo doubt.
In tho- so-cr.lled Higb. Cocinand Cose, or Coso Ho. 12
f . '
(United S-j-ctos of Ancricr. vs V/'ilhela von LG,eb.et cl), tho
defendant Vi/rltor Ur.rlinont wrs one of these sentenced by
the Iribuncl to inprisonnent for lifo. In the findings
referring to hin, there opper.rs the following possnges
"In the progron rdoptcd by tho leaders of
the Third Reich wherein they undertook to inspire
the G-ernr.n populoticn to Qurdor Allied _fliers by
lynch Icvi/ or ^'nob justice' , they were indeed sink
ing deeper into the norr.ss of' dcpr.^^vity Por in
this they undertook to incite the Gc.rn-^i people to
set r-.sido tho E.",fcgunrds of lew built up through
centuries end to resort to nob violence." (Pogo
299 of judgnont in Cc.sc Ho--'12)-.
Thb c.bovcquoted drr.ftj' which Hitter forw'*'.rdcd
to the Arcxy High Coancndj according to Exhibit 1235 (R^
118), cynicnlly states': "It follows from the ebove, tho.t
the nein weight of the r.ction will' hove to be plo.ccd on
lynchlngs," The relrtion betv^^een this drcft end-the finc.1
procedure c.doptcd is discussed on pngos 302, 3o5 of thut
judgncnt,
A grc-'^ t nunber of Gefncn officers, soldiers, police
men und civilicns, who cerried out the lynch policy ngninst
I .jillied fliers, cs est.cblished by the tc.^n work of
Hlbbcntxop - Hitter - Keitol - Jodl, hove been sen
tenced by British o,nd American wcr crime' tribunnlt? "to
denth by ho.nging. Sees "Low Reports of Tric.ls of^Wn'r
Cximinols", London, 1947 end'1948, Vol. I prges 81 ot seq.
nnd 88 ot
/'
=eq» and Vol» IIj:, prges 60, 61 and 62 (S^t scq.
Also, testimony of Colonel John C. HcLendon in the Justice
co.se, pa,ges 3230-3233 of the txinl record there, In the
present case submitted for judicial notice in Doc unent
Book 41, Engl. pages 30-32.
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iB» R i t t e r- c.nd the Egorgund Hurdor^
The defojidcnt R -I T T E R pnrticip'^ted in tlie
scheme of murdering Allied ConiQr.ndo troops.
In its opening stntement, dolivored on 6 janurry
1948-, Prosecution allogod;
said
''ITo defense, and no, mitigating circumstances,
can be a^dducod in connection v/ith the proclamation
encouraging the German civiliajr -population to lynch
Allied a.yiators who had been forced by military
action to land in Germany, nor can any conceivable
circumstances justify the infamous order of 18
October 1942 that all Allied Commandos, even if in
full uniform and unarmed-,should be 'slaughtered
to the last man'' or murdered after a brief inter
rogation. In the casG of the fliers, we will -find
the-responsibility shared by defond'^.nts from the
Foreign Office, the Reich Chancellery, the Blinistry
of propaganda, and the SS. Execution of the
•'Commando Order' was customarily accomplished by
V/ehxmacht troops or SS men, but hero, too, we will
find several of the Foreign Qffioe defend'-nte
'covering up' these r.iurders and conce'^ling them
from inquiries made by Switsoxland, as the protec
tive power."
(opening statement p.*36)
In another passage of the /opening st-^tenent, it i£
j
"In the war crimes committGd against comba
tants and prisoners of w^r set forth in Count
Three of the indictment, the Foreign Office
w"s constantly concerned in order to conce^.l their
commission. Thus, when uniforacd British Commando
troops wore captured and slau-jhtored in IJorway and
the Swiss Legation made inquiries, the defendant
R i t t G r, with the approval of Weizsaecker and
the cooperation of the German anmed forces, oon-
Gocted the mendanicus reply that the soldiers ha.d
been killed in combat." (ibid, page 99)
The Egorsund affair, mentionod in the last quoted
accusation against the defendant R i t t e r, was one of
the most atrocious instances -of the carrying out of the
infamous Commando order. -From thecontemporaneous Gorman
source which is p^os. Exh. 1220," (PS-50B,' I)oc.,E-.39, Engl.
p. 29), the facts appc-r in their shocking brutality. T^g
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quote the-"follo\^ing parts of' two, top .secret teletypes froa
^ . I
Intelligence Held Sta-tion Norway to the loreign Intelli
gence DepartDcnt of the Aray High Coaliand..
\
(Eroa first teletype):
"Subjects CoDQando Raid.
On Hovorabcr 20, 1942 at 5-50 an onoay plane
was found 15 lOa HE of Egoreund, It is a British
aircraft (towed glider, Qa.de of wood without
engine). Of the 17 nenber crew 3 are dead, 6 a.re
severely, the others slightly wounded.' All wore
English" hhaki uniforns without sleeve-insignia.
Furtheraoro following itcas were found; 8 Imap-
sacks, tents j skis and radio -transnitterexact
nuaber is unknown. Ihe glider carried rifles,,
light r.ia,chine guns and nachino pistols, nunbcr^un—
known. At present the prisoners are with the 3n.
in Egersund."
Exhibit 1220 (PS-508, Doc.E,.'39, Engl. p. 31).
(Eron socond toletypo)';
"Boforonco: Our No. 3/304/42 Top Secrot III E of
20 Nov 42.
Subjects OoDnia.nclo Raid,
Countor-IntolligoncG Office (A^T) -reports to
above teletypes
Beside the 1? neabor crew extensive sabotage
aa.terial and work equipncnt were found, '
the sabotage purpose w's absolutely proved, ^ ^
280th Inf. Biv. (j .B,) the oxocuticn oi
action a.cccrding to the •Fuehrer ' s order., _inc
execution w^s ,carried out toward the
Nov. 20. Scne of Ithe prisoners wore blue -
under their kh-ki uniforns which had
the psTomrnc! 'nn-rTn.cr r pVinrt interrogationsleeves. Bu i g a shor ation^
"vivors have revealed nothing but their na.nc.^,,
Xanks , a.nd s c r ial nuaber s
(Ibid)
1?he brutality ^and the cruelty of the nurdur-of the
.surviving ncubcrs of a -British plane which had cr. sh^d in
the Egersund sector,five of whom were wounded, and all of
whon voluntarily eurxendered, thereby acquiring the staius
eh acre olerrly In Exhibit^of prisoners of wax, a/pj/e'.'rs eve
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1221 (NG-2572, Doc.3. 59, 3-P, 34 r.t 40), teletype froa
addressed
the Arny High Coaannd (Mr. jor'Kipp) of 14 Mry 1943/to
E i t t e r, inforaing hln of the following reply of the
Arny Conncndox Horwry to v.n inquiry of the Arny High
V /
Conarnds ' , ' \ .
"Subj_CGt;_ British srbotcg^.' troops nt Sgorsund
fo Eup-plonent prr. I of the neaorrndun sub- • '
Ditted on 11 Mry 1943 with letter Ho. 002251/45, _
top secret, V/ESf/QiX, (IV), the MilitTy Coanrndor , ''
Horwy reports the following by teletype letter
upon,inquiry by teletypes
• 'In the night froa 19th to 20 Hoveaber
lookout in Hellelond rhpcrts thrt he wrs
rccostod by 2 Britons who rsked hia for ac-
dic.rl c.ssistrncc'for 5 wounded who hrd
Ir.nded in r glider northeast of Hoevelmd,
' Cbaarndlng Officer of sub sector EgerA
sund (11/335) disprtchos fighter conamdo
to plrcc of cr^sh. There, the following
iconplenent of glider i-s rsccrtrineds one
Mst Lt., 1 pilot Officer, 8 persons unhurt,
4 wounded nnd 3 dend. The two Britons who
voluntarily led the fighter hoanondo to the
crr.sh x^Io.ce r.s well os the rest of the crow
surrendered wifhout resistrnce.
'All nenbers of the crew wore British^
uniforns with blue ski suits under the uni-
fora, So thot they could hove oppeored c..e
civilirns c.t any tine, Interrogo.tion
ccrricd out by the locol SB established
solely the ns.rAes, otherwise no results*
» Sr.bot'-gc •r.ir.tcrio.l found:
doaclition chrrges end explosives, d'^ggers,/
nop with ne^-suronents 1,: 1.000-000 with
o.rrow pointing to Rjukm-
Ajiplicntion of Fuehrer hccree ordered by
,280. I.B- ^ ^
Sub sector Bgorsund reports the °
of Fuehrer decree on 20 Hovcaber,(oxecutibn crrxied out by soldiers).
Froa another p.-rt of Exhibit 1221 (HG-2572/
39, p. 34), it o.pneers th'^ t the British Governaent, thro .^h
the Swiss Govprnnent, on \7 Mr.y 1943,'nbout six rtonths
after the Egersund aurder, nade-at the Gcrnrn Foreign
Office inquiry concerning the truth of reports neceived
- 20 -
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ciccording to- which aeabors of British Arncd Borces, cc,p—
taxed while cr.rrying out coabot r.dtion in Gcxanny and in
territory occupied by G-ernany, were executed shortly after
their capture. In particular it was stated, that seventeen
noabcrs of a 'British Airborne Division who during the
night froa.19 to 20 hoveaber. 1had crash-landed in,a
glider in the South of hoTway^ near Sgorsund yyere;' executed
after their/canture, thus in violation of the baSic /
principles of international law concerning the tre^taent
of prisoners of war, , \ '
Bron again other parts o^f Exhibit 1221 (BG-2572,
Doc, B. 39, pp* 35 to ^3), it appears that the' Boreign
Office throu^^^h E i t t e r reguestod the Army High Coa-^
nand to supply it'with the -data concerning the Egersund
incident and sinilar incident's and that this roguest was
coapliod with by docuQonts person^^lly handed over through
Mao or Kipp to E i t t o r and by way of oral conversa-
tions between the two''of then,
Anong the doc^nents thus turned over to E i t t o r
for the inforaation of the Boreign Offibo, there was a
nonorandun dated 10 Ma.y 1943 (Doc. B, 39> P- 35)? which
contains this statenont;
"In the ovcint thrt a protest should bo re
ceived by the Goxarn Govornncnt from the protcc-
tivG power the j'uchrer wishes the reply to bo in
the follov^iing sense?
(-1) Soldiers of countries at \v:-r with us, so-far as
they are in uniforn and cajrry out a task^oi oD-
viously Qilitary nature w.ill be trcted in _
.accordahcc with the Geneva Convention that>is
' to say, they will be nade prisoners of 'W^r
after being ovorpowoxed.
(2) Soldiers of oneay st'^tos who are droppo^A behind
our linos for treaohcrous sabotage purposes
and who, judging fron their appearance, afo nov
in regular uniforn (or we-:r civilian olothP-n-G)
or are eaaippcd with treacherous weapons (s'gg
cncloeurQ) will, as publicly announced be sliot
•in conbat without pardon. This neasure is al
ready nocGssary to pTotcct persons, who arc
attempting arrest, fron wily attacks,"
/
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, It is not nocGSscry to discuss whetiiGr the just
quoted directive of Hitler wos consistent with the prin
ciples of •'intornctionr,! low on trootaent of priEcners of
wor. For even if this would be o.ssuned for the sokc of
orguaent, it would be no defense to whnt hcipponed in
Egcrsund with the British fliers after their surrender as
prisoners of war.. They were in unifora at the tiae of
their capture and they were not shot in coa]Da.t.
V/hile a. reply to the British G-ovcrnaent (through
the Swiss G-ovornaent) in accordance with the abovequotod^
directive of Hitler would thus have served the purpose of ,
justifying the Bgersund incident only if it would have
been coupled with a false statenent of the facts involved
tha,t is with a. denial of the true facts as alleged in the
British note, Hitter suggosted a report which while
/ *
not revealing what happened in Egorsund and thus leaving
open the truthfulness or untruthfulness cf the inforaation,
received by the .British Governaent fron other sources
* \
would noverthcless bring the Egersund incident in line
with the general policy thus announced .by the GQrna--n _ ^
Governnent, In particular he suggested to replace the
phrase "be shot in conbat without pardon" in paragraph 2
\
of Hitler's directive by the phrase "slaughtered without
pardon" . The foregoing appears froa c. further
Exhibit 1221 (lTG-2572, namely t'he docuacnt on PP *
ef Book 39), which will be quoted iaacdiatoly*
I't is a neaoranBua of Warlinont, dated M ^ '•
of his phone convcrsaticn cn the daao day with R i ^ '
which in part reads s .
"On 1,7 liry 1943, 1825 hours, nnhcesrdcr Rigg(Foreign Office 5, pointing out th^^t he^did no
censidcr the natter particularly urgent, tn.
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the other hand however he did net wish to pj.
it, inforaed us by telephone of the following
of the Goraan reply to the British'note:
/
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Soldiers of the Sto.tcs' c.t Wr.r with.
G-ornrJiy, as far r.'S they carry oat ob-
vioasly ailitr.ry tasks and as far as
they wear regalar anxforns, are.treated
according to inter'];^.tiona.l law^ i.e»
they a.ro made prisoners after they ha.vc
been overpowered, *
However, Denbcrs of the Eneay powers,
Who infiltrate behind the fighting front
in order to coaait insidious sabotage
acts and.carry,out such acts by using
treacherously concealed weapons or civi
lian clothes or in any other unsoldiery
Qaxinor, are not treated as soldiers, "
but slaughtered v;ithout pardon,
(handwritten aarginal note referring to the words
^slaughtered without pardon'); Here the words 'in
coabat' are aissing . ' • ,
(conpa.re text of Chief Operational Staff and'"'
"Sappleacnt of '.Tehraacht Report of 7 October),
In the 'event of rpproval by the QIQI, AabavS—
"sador R i r t e r intends to subnit this draft to
the Reich Fpreifiin Minister^ Sinco his own Minister
is net yet inforoed on the reply planned by
R i t t e r, the Anbassador roquests that the draft
in its present forn be not yet s.ubnitted to the
Fuehrer, He regards it as a natter of course that
after approval has been obtained by the 0IC7, the
Reich Foreign Minister, prior "to dispa^tch of the
note, will subnit it to the Fuehrer to obtain his
a.pproval,"
From r. note on top of .the docunont, initialed by
^ Eoitel, it appears that subject to ninor changes Keitcl
approved this' draft on the 18th of May 1943, A note on
ibe botton of the docunent shows tha.t Major Kipp on the
20th of May inforned R i t t e r by phone of this appro-
"^^•1 by Keitel, tha.t ICipp at the sane tine- objected to the
omission .of the words "in conbat",. and that R i t t e r
therGupon pronised to call' special attention to this de-
in hie oral report to Ribbcntrop..
fhat in the further course of the intor-o'ffioe ncgo-^
tic„tiong involved,, the original text of Hitler's dircctivc^
w. e restored o,nd thus Hitter 'a anended version not
'..dopted, r.ppears fron the following parts of Exhibit 1221
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{m-2572f Doc.B. 59, E.p. 46), which is a file note of the
Araj?- High Conrncind, of 24 Mr.y 1943, initir.led "by Mr.jor Kipp,
as well as Y/arliaont a,nd Eoitel, containing this statcacnt;
"Anha.ssadox Hitter (Foreign Office)
reports the following by telephone on 24 May 1945?
1800 hrc»2
^ \
"In the draft of the reply note subaitted .
by telephone on 17 May 1943, the request for a.aend*
' nent by^ Chief 0107 has been coaplied with and in
addition the words 'in coabat' have been added a,t
the end of para.graph-2.
f
"(The 'note was approved by the Fuehrer in
the anended fora after .verbal report by t:^e Eoich
Foreign Minister. The note will presuaably be
disprtchdd on 25 May 1943."
A-The next following part of the sane exhibiti, i221
(Doc.B.-39, Engl. pp. 47,48),' contains E i t t e r
top secret letter to the Arny 'High Connand (Attention,
Major ICipp), dated Salzburg, 25 Hr^y 1943, in substance
' I
confirming the aboveaentioned phone conversation and
a.ttaching the a.pproved draft of the G-c^nan reply to the
British Governnont's inquiry concorning the Egersund
incident which, hcwdver, is not'cxpressly acntioned.
Finally, concluding the scries of docunents sub
aitted by the prosecution with regard to the Egersund |
incident, is Sxliibit 1222 (IIG-3887, Doc.E. 39, E.p. 51,)
^r
a soerot teletype from Eibbentrop to Steongracht, dated
17 May 1943, drafted by E i t t' c f, wherein the reply
note is sent to Stoongracht for the purpose of tranv-nit
"to Switzerland as the protoctivo power.
The docunents so far discussed do not show
urrcG of attoapt by the defendant R i t t e r or
superior Eibbontrop or other nenbors of thes ForelgJ^ Of-tJ"
to express disapproval of this nost atrocious Egersund
incident. They rather' iDrovc the conschting and even
>hetivGly cooporrtivG attitude on behalf of the defendai^i
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Hitter c.ncl the Poxoign office e.s o.. whole with regard
to the policy of the Arny High Connojid to secure the con—
tinned enforconent of the CGaaondo order by denying the
unlawfulness of what ha,d happened a,t Egersund^ concealing
the facts.known to the Aray High Conaand and the Poroign
Office, and a^nnpuncing general principles as p, justifica
tion of what aight- have happened. This picture ronains
essentially the saae v/hcthor we look to the G^rnan roplj^
as it finally went out or to its text as- suggested by •
Hitter. Hy leaving out the words "in coabat", the
' ^
i note would, of course,^ have had a. less lying character but
on .the other havUd o. Qore atrocious stateaent of principle.
^ By the finally approved text, the note bocane on its face
less atrocious but it was in no way consistent with wha,t
actually happened in the Egersund incident and therefore
a flagrant violation of the duty established in inter-
national law, to connunicate through the protective Power
the full truth of the circunsta^ncee under which a. nunber
of prisoners of vjar was killed after their ca^pturc. ^
Hitter <s Bofenso
The attcnpt of the defendant Hitter, (Tra-n—
script pages 11921-11952), to justify his and the Poreign /
Office's attitude concerning the Egersund incid'ent ca.nnot
"be considorod but o. coaplote failure. H i t t e r cla-ias
that after he had received through Major ICipp the text of
Hitler's' coanando order, ho told Kipp'"that the wlfiolc thing
was a nonstroeity" (Transcript page, 11-924) and that
"would do everything ...i. to oxcito the Poreign Mihistcr
against this connando order." • (Transcript page 1 1925)#
HipwevGr,, he hiasclf suggested such a, draft of the reply
note that^ if approved, it would have'^ stated a pr.inciple-
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even aorc atrocious than that to he found on^ the face of
Hitler's conamdo order. R, i t t e r claiQS that he
\
wanted to have the words "in ccabat" onitted in order "tha.t
ria^ttors should he brought into confcraity with the truth".
(Transcript page 1.1926). However^ if his suggestion
would have been approved,, the G^^rnan reply would at least
by inplica.tion ha-ve" cla.iued that "slanghtcring without
pa.rdon" of encay soldiers of the kind descrxbed in pma,—
graph 2 of the note would be a policy jiTstifiablo in terns
•of international la.w, to be continued by G^rnany on sini-
la,r future occasions. . '
R i t t c i states that the Porcign Office "was
faced with the a.ltornative of either lying or consenting
to a criae" (Transcript page 11928) and the dr^ft suggest—
f
cd by him indicates that he•preferred consenting to a.
crime to lying. However, what a.ctually happened with his .
a.ctive cooperation, by way of the reply note of the Poroxgn
Office, was both lying by concealing the facts ojnd consent
ing to a crino by not apologizing for it. but a.tteapting
• - /
tp cover it up. Of course, according to R i t t or, the
final test of the reply.note vr s all right. Says he; "It
was an evasion. Jt was a failure to accept a part of the
inquiry but it was not a lie".., (Transcript page 11939)
By taking this position R i t t e r displays th<-t
kind of cynieier.i which was characteristic of those p3ro- _
Sessional diplomats who readily adjusted their
tc.,.lGnts to the murdor policy of the Thitd Raich.
^he. so.mo spirit of cynicism characte rlzes the fol
lowing part of R i t t G r 's tostimony upon crpss-G^^-'^ ^ '^*'
nation;
wc wore confronted with an oi.icrgcncy.Either one did not reply to the note, or o-nc .-dn
ted quite frankly that a criao had been a.
o. V-1/-T 4.1--. y I 1^ .--TJ .1-. QO pUuand then pronisGd that the guilty ones wou
before a court aartials. >In this case it wouia n.-we
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Vhfid to "bo Hitler hiosclf, "bccr'.usG in tiir.t ccso ho
issued the orders, sonething T/hich wos quite ia-
p'oEsible then, you con seo'. Or, one could lie,
quite evidently, .end scy the opposite of whot is
the truth, or one could use o.n excuse ns a woy^out,
in this note, I chose this vvo.y out. I pr.rtici-
pr.ted in_ it, not by drrfting it and not by sending
the note out, but aerely, in ny capacity as lianson
Dan between Ribbentrop and iCeitel, by transaitting
these ev'asionE or these notes or excuses between
the two•
Q» But this evasion .was a, swindle too, to
put it bluntly, isn't that corrbct?
A. Yes, you can call it that, yes, if you
will, literally, and in the logical evaluation of
these notes, it was not a swindle but rather, an"I
have already'' stated, it was a. quite evident evasion
because we were unwilling to'give an^answcr."
(Transcript pages 12452, 12453)» '
SuDDing up the foregoing, it appears that the ,
defendant R I T T E R helped to onforce the coaaando order
"by Cooperating in the gross vidla.tion of the duty, under
international law, to give, the protective power truthful
infoxadtion about the fate of the prisonors of war who
I
were aurdored as result of that order.-
t
"Others^ who ha.d been helpful in the'carrying out
of that atrocious order,' received doa.th sentences fron
British and Aaorioan w^.r cririo courts# As -
wo aay cite the lostler Cqse, "law Reports of »Var
1
CrlQinalB",*'Tol. I, lonfion 1947, prgos 22 ct seq.
, -
.../ ^ •• , • V• vv: :
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iC* RITTEE cind the SAGAN nurdor.* "
The dcfcndr^nt Hitter wr„s connocted with the
schGQG of killing British fliers who hod escrped fror.i the
So..g"n officers conp. In oJder to properly svr.luote the
orininc.l notaro of his end the Foreign office's connecti'cn
with the Sngr.n cffr.ir, the fr.cts specifice-lly concoxning
this incident cc.nnot he looked upon c.s on isolcted ar.ttor*
They a.re tied in with other incidents discussed in this
hrief, showing the overr.ll orine of the Foreign Office's
$
nnd ospeoiolly Hitter 's continuous violr.tion. of the
nost eleaentnry principles of internoticnnl low concerning
treotoiont of prisoners of wor. The criainol chr.roctor of
the rcspectivo cctivitics of the Foreign Office defondonts
only in port consisted in'' the ccTorihg up of crines n.lrcr.dy
coanitted, by evoEivo or outright ricndrcicus diploaotic
notes o.nsworing inoiuiries of the protective pow^x- On
other occosicnss they were r.cccssorics before rnd to the
fr.Gt»
In port of its findings y the HIT st-'^ted;
"In Morch 1944 fifty officers of the British
Royr.l Air I •-roc, v;ho escaped fron the corep nt So.g"^
.whore thoy vv'ere confined os prisoners; v/cre shot
on rec.npturGj on the direct orders'of Hftlcra,
Their bodies were iaaedi-otoly cren"'to..l.
urns containing their o.shos wore rot:;.:i:n-.-d '.-o
cr,np„ It wrs not contondod by the def'-ndcn-^s tn...
this wns otbor then plr.ln nurdcr> in Cf;ap1.^-c vxo-
lr..ticn of intornr'ti.onr.l l.ew-" . ..{TdT Tr-^nscript pr.go 16838^ oQieuoiuea en
Boo.1,40 p Eep-1)c
This dotornin.-ticn of wh-t hr:v-,Gnod tc the fifty
Rbovo-nontionoa prieonore of w.x oftor their roQrptaxo
fron nn ottonpt to.ogcp.po p,nd th,-t this involved
nurdor in ccQpicte violr.tion of intornrticnol 1"Wj e.ppcors
e.s binding upon the prosonf Tribun.-l in view of Article X,
of Ordinance Ho. 7, quoted harGinabove in Sooticn I,
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especially in the absence of substantial nev; evidonco to
.the contrary. in |this connection it laay well be aentioncd
th. t the affidavits in Defense Docuaont Book E i t t g r
II, Ji. pp. 15 ct SG(^,, fax fron refuting the above finding
of the IMI, a.ro rather, corroborating, it» For instance the
affidavit of Thocdor iCrafft, who at the tiae-in question'
Wc.s a. Colonel in the Pris-oner of 'Jar Affairs Division of
the-Arny High Conaand, headed by. Col. von V/esthoff (Doc.
Book E i t t Gr ii, pa.ge 15, et seq,), anong other^things
states 2 ' ' ' .
, ^ tine after the escape^ of the Brit
ish flight officers fron Caap Saga.n - which was
probably a.bout 25 March 1944 — V/esthoff inforned
no upon returning fron a "ccnferoncc with Koitel,
, , that by order of Hitler the police had rocoived
4 • orders to use their wc-pcns ruthlessly when the
. " • escaped'officers were captured. b'csthoff»s ob'joc-
tion was rejected by Keitel with the.ronark that
this order wr-s already being cr-rried out and any
objection was useless. We did not
know in our office how the police had carried out
Hitler's order in capturing the escaped flight
officers. V/e ncroly received the report via tele—
iypo nossago that the British prischors of wr^r,
designated by na-no, had boon shot in flight by the
police a.nd or for resisting capture. Several
teletype neseagos concerning this cane in, which
contained groups of nanes in each case."
affidavit of Adolf Wosthoff, identical with /
•tiiG nbovcnentioned Cel. Wosthoff (Doc. Book R i t t 'c r • •^
SS • -
Engl, p,p2)j |Xn part relate
'*I know of the escape of the British P7/'a
fron Stalrg Luft III in S-gan on 25 March 1944
fbo tine of ny foxnor activity, Sonorof
^fnxod pV/'s were shot by the police on
Hitler's orders alre'^dy a. few days aftir their
esc p I '
ft * •
Ihc tacts concerning the nurdor itself are thus
clearly established. However, it is for the present
Tribunal to docido to what extent the Foreign Office, and,
especially the defendant R i t t e r, becane involved in
"this natter after those nurdera ha,d already been perpetra-
tddt '
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Thfoagh. the coincidenoG thr.t c. British Officer Vv-ho
had "been the senior prieoner in Sr.gnn woe onong those PT'e
reciprocclly oxchr.ngecl on the ground of serious injury or
eiclmcssy the British wore very socn inforned ahout the
true foots. Inquiries were Qcde ond protests roised by
the British Crovornrienty both by woy of diplonotic notes
forwo.rded through Switzerland, the p^^otcctiva Power, and
hy wo.y of n. doclo.r;^tion of the Porcign Minister Anthony
Eden in the Britislx HoU-se of Coraaons*
The text of the &crn"n diplonotic notes onsworing
those inquiries and protests wrs not yet c-vrilo.ble os'
evidence in this cse nt the tine when the defendant
R i t t e r took the strnd nor at tho oven previous t'iac
when Dr. Yilbreclit ga.ye his affidavit contained in Befonsc
Bocuncnt Dock E i t t o r II, E,p,19a This explains the
obviously Qista.kon st^tonent of Dr. Albrccht concerning
the question whethor tho acrnan reply note of June 1944,
drafted by hia, w^s approved by Ribbontrop a.nd actually
dispatched, a.nd the evasive character ofRitter
tostidony on this point. However, subsequently, nancly as
port of prosoctuion's Rebuttal Book 215-B, full text
"both of the G^rna.n reply note of Juno 1944 and of the
final G^rn'-n note of July 1944 was subnitted as prosecution
Exhibit C-372, HG«5844.
It appears froa that docuaont that in a.ddition to
P^i-oliainaxy note, subnitted to the Swiss legation al-
^cady on 17 April 1944, two Gc^rn '^n diplcn'^tic nctos con-^
acrning the Sa.ga.n incident were actually connunioated to
the British Govornnent through the Swiss icg"''^ lcn in
G-ernany, one dated 6 June 1944, rjiswering a Swiss note of
26 May 1944, handed to the Swiss legation by tho then
lernan Stato Secretary, tho defendant von Steongracht in
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pcrsoni the other dr.tcd 21 July I944j answering a. Swiss
note of 26 juno 1944.
J^roQ the saae docunent it appears that the note of
6 June 1,94-4 had a lying character in th-t it contained a
version a.ccording to which the prisoners of war in question
were shot partly on account of resistance after their ro-
capture, partly hocauso of attcnpts of ro—eecapo; that,
however, the G-ornan IPoreign Office expressly reserved to
nake a definite and norc detailed st-^tencnt after the con
clusion of the investigation. The wording of the pertinent
pa,rt of the note is as follows;
"The Foreign Offico is plo'-sed to coraauni-
cate tho following to the Sv/iss legation, protoa—
tion Dopartnent in answer to tho note of 26 May
1944 No. 743 in-regard to tho escaae of British
officers froa S^ala.g Buft.5; A prolininary note
was subaitted to tho Swiss Logaticn already on
17 April, i.G,, shortly after tho escr-pe which
took place on 25 March. According to tho investi
gations reade aoanwhilo it is certain that 19 out
of the 80 prisoners of war who oscaped at that
tiao were taken back to tho canp „ •'Jhilc tho hunt
still ccntinuGs af this writing and the investiga
tions have not been concluded as yet, thoro a.ro
preliainary rox>orts on ha.nd saying that 37 PV/"'s
of British nationality wore shot when they,
03:ought to bay by the pursuing detachnont, offered
^ceistancG or attor.ipted a now esoapo after their
2^c-capture. Additional prolininary reports arc
on hand showing that 13 other PV/'s of non-British
nationality were shot a.ftor having escaped fron the
IaS? cC'i-^P • ^bo Foreign Offico rcs'orves to nako a
^iinitc dotrilod statonent after tho conclusion
Investigation and as soon as tho detailsWill be W
Ihe pronise in the just quoted note, to give fur-
thor dot^-iT^ j.
•• lie, was not fulfilled by tho Gcrnrn Govornnont
^hder P^Gtoxt, a.s appc'crs frou the text of the reply
note of Qi -r -1 . n
' July 1944, Follows tho text of the note of
21 July
"Tho Foreign Office has pleasure to a..ckno\7'dcdgo 'to the Swiss Legation - Spcci-^.l Bopaftnont •
_no roooipt of the note d-^tcd 26 Juno - No. 983 «
^Gl^^.ting to tho evasion of P7f*s fron Stslag Luft.
On 23 Juno, the British Foreign Secretary,
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without cwr.xtins the rosult of the Goxnc.n invcs—
tisr.tlons no.do o- d.oolr,rr.tion in this respect
which the Goverhixcnt of the Reich aost onphoiticclly
projects♦ Tho Foreign Secrotrr^'' of c country which
stortcd the "bonb wor o.goinst the civilian popula
tion, a,nd which nurdored tens of thousands of
G-QXacin woaon end children by terror ettecks on
plo..ccs of rosidonco, hospitels end cultural insti
tutions; which, in e.n officially printed 'nanue.l
on nodorn irrcgule-X warfare' for 'His Majesty's
Service' literally orders its soldiers to use the
nothods of gangsters, as for instance to gouge out
the oyos of defenseless encnics lying on the
ground or to crush their heads with stones aust be
denied the aoral right to aako a stand in this
aattcr a.t all or to raise ccnplaints against
others# In ccnsideraticn of this unprecedented
a.ttitudc of the fritish Foreign Secretary the
Governaent of the Bcich declines to aa.ko further
coraaunications in this na.tter."
Exhibit 0^372 (KG—5844), of course, proves that the
text of the Gorrrn reply note of Juno 1944 was correctly
stated by Rr, Albrecht in his oral report at the confer—
once of 22 June 1944 and that this report was correctly
recorded in von Thaddon's nencrandua Exhibit 1283 (NG-
3496, Roc.B, 40, E.p.4).
That there aust have been an error in Albrocht's^
challenging the correctness of von Thaddon's acaofa.ndaa,
was clear oven before Exhibit C-372 had been introduced _
since Prosocuticn Exhibit 1284 (NG-2318, I)oc#B.40, E.p.7)#
us part of an inter-office conaunication of 15 July 194'r,
ha^s this passaa'o;
"The Reich Minister for foreign Affexrs
bequests Aabassador R i t t c r to qwi«s
"tho Swiss envoy our second reply to_ vva.r
Eogation regarding the escape of pris
Stalag Luft# 3."
The phra.se "our soccnd reply" aakes if
u first reply hcd been sent out before 15 July 19^4 which
obviously i, iclontioal with the note, the dr^ft of which
W.-S agreed to by Eeitcl on 4 June 1944, acccrding "bo
E i t t o r ig nGaorandun dated 5 June 1944, which i^
Exhibit 1282, HG-3901 , I)oc,B#40, E.p,2.
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In adcli'tion, Albxeoht's version in his hforGncn—
"bioned r.ffidr^vit wo.s not confiraod "by tho. rcspoctivo
tcstiaony of R i t t g r liiasolf whoy of coursoj wclcor-icd
this version but wos obviously cfro.id thrt its incorroct-
nosE any cloorly o.,ppc*^.r froD docuacnts to bo submittod on
cross-exr.ainuticn o,nd thorGfcrc govo concGrning this point
xother cvasivo cjid equivocal cnswors (Trrnscript po.gcs
II94I5 11942 und 11946y 11947),
There oonnot bo c.ny doubt obout tho f-ct thrt tho
J^oroign Officey including R i t t o r, hod loomed the
truth obout tho killing of the fifty Iritish Officers froa
Cc.,ap Sogon before the drrfting of the note of June 1944
und certoinly before 5 June 1944 on which dry R i t t c r
in port of 0. acnoro.ndua subnittcd to the then Stnte
Socroto.ry Steongrrcht tiodo this stotcnent:
, "On 4 June G-onorolfcldrao.rscho.il Keitel
inforaod no th^.t he ogroed to the droft of the
Legotipn rogording Britishpiisonors of v/or« He oskod vdiy v;c i^ontcd to
inforn the protecting power of tho funerol
hoforehond. This hod not been requested in
the Swiss note, I replied thot on 0. previous
ocGoeion Switpiorlond hod ruquosted this o.nd
thot tho connondor of Sogon, Colonel Brouno,
hod ogreed to it. Keitel then olso 0greed,"(Exhibit I282y hG-390l, Boc.B, 40., E.p.2),
At tho lotost they bccr^no oworc of the full truth
tl-uring the conferencos in Salzburg conc^^rning the Sogon
ineidcnt, which took place on or about 25 May 1944 between
^cicign Office officialsy aenbers of tho Arny Hl.gh Coaraond
-nd Gestapo officials, o..s o-ppoors frora the follarwing po.sB-
of the abovcacntionod affidavit of Aibrocht :
jy . "A few days later, two officials of thic
Office of the Cjiainal Police appeared J-nSalzburg and subnitted photost"tie copies of
tclotypo raossogcs or written reports in vvliich thc9
cf^o nuaber of St.-"-to poliGo Directorate
+>. various parts of Garn-^ny reported about"Che shooting of individuals or of entire groups of
prisoners of war escaped fron'Sagan, In tho reports
the statcnent was always nadOy cither that the es
capees had been shot in resisting roGaptur-o or in
ronowed attcapte to escape aftor^capture. ,A11 the
material created the iraproesion of bav-iyir. -benri in^i i h ving ' en i -
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vented, r/hon confronted with, this, the offioio.ls
of the Ecioh Offico cf Pclice did not
actually adait it in,so aany-words, but did not
disputo'it seriously." (Dcfonso Doo.B. Hitter
II, E.p. 20). '
•Hitter hinself referrin;^ to those ' conferoncce
at Salzburg thG_ dr^tc of which ho reconstructs as of on
or about 25 May 1944 (Direct,, page 11933) states that
froa his convcxsaticn with Col. Kraft he learned that "a
horrible act had ta.kcn pla.0G, in the course of which 46—
50 British Officers had been shot", and he a,dds: "That
was nothing new to nc at that aoacnt insofar as froa
the forged police telegraas X hc-d gafhored the sa.ae
thing." (Direct, page 11939).
In a previous 'part of his tostiaony on direct,
R i t t G r sinilarly, but acre in detail, states;
"Soon, two SD officials arrived froa Dorlin.
Thoy brought a, nuabor of tologr'*.nE froa various
parts of the RQich containing roports about the
shooting of escaped prisoners cf war, sent by the
local policG to a central agency in Berlin, I pre-
suae to the HSH/i or soae to the Bgrlin Centra.l
Agency. These telegraas indicated that af a nua
bor of pla.cos in G-Qraany the prisoners of \vr^ ha,d
been shot, either while esca.ping or a.ftcr thoir
rc-caisturo when trying to oscapo once again.
\7hGn Albxocht told ac about those telegrrns I
said 'Do lot ao see then*, and at first sight I
said; ^Albrecht, that's r. swindle.' I tunbled to
it because although the-se tv/olve to fifteen tele
graas outwardly, as far a,E the outer fora went,
wore very carefully ioitafod to lock like genuine
telegraas, and all the outward foraalitios wore
a-ccur.atoly reproduced, the contents of the tele
graas wore so childishly siaplc, they all sounded
so alike for all those twelve or fifteen cases
that to a halfway intelligent reader it was obvi
ous that twelve to fifteen agencies could not soncL
in telegraas so identical in text." (Transcript
Pr-.ge 11936).
Hovertheless Hitter a.daits that he advisod
Albreoht to draft the reply note in a way adopting the
nendacioue vef-sion of the forged telegr'^ns, as
froa his teatinony on direct, wherein ho at the saae tiac
claias, in substance, that he did it only for the purposO
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of thereby deaonstrr.ting to Ribbontrop the o.bsurdity of '
such 0. reply (Trcnscrxpt pcges 11936, 11937). This pica
is, of course, utterly incredible. There ce.nnot, there
fore, be any doubt about the foot that R i t t e r was
instruEiental for the aendacious text of the reply note
drafted by Albroeht the wording and officia-1 date of
which (6 Juno 194^r) appear froci Exhibit C-372 (NG-5841-,
hoc. Booh 215 B, Enrgl» pages 127 et seq,.).
Th,e fictitious story, contained in the note of
6 June 194-4, rcna.incd the^only version of the Sagan inci
dent vdiich the Geraan foreign Office found worthwhile to
connunicate through the Protective PqWcT to the Britiph.
Govcrnnent. By the flat refusal of further explanation,
being the contents of the note o€ 21 July 1944, the lying
reply in the June note was made definite.
That in this whole scheaG R 1 t t e r participated,
at least froa about 25 May 1944 on, as Ribbentxop^s right-
hand nan and a,s the top liaison official acting botwoen
foreign Office and Hfgh Coaaand, appears clearly fron
several clocuricnts, fron his own tGEtlnony and fron the
aforeaenticnod defense affidavits of %aft and of
Albrecht.
It is ianaterial whether the neiadacicus drafts of
G P^^elininary reply was subaitted to Ribbentrop by
Ri t t, e r, a,s Albrecht states in his affidavit •(hcfc2iso
•Bock Hitter n, Engl. p. 2o), or whether it was^
C S R -4 j
" ^ clains (Transcript page 11938), subaitted0 Ribbentrop by y.ibreoht with the advice of and assis-
'-nee by R Xt.t e r. That both of thea, while they
'--c.^eed -fee subait to Ribbentrop a roply-dr:"ft, bafsed on
"the fictiticuE police version, should have; dooiclecl to
dissuade Ribbentrop frtin approval of the draft, and tk-^t
they^ should have accordingly acted, is uttt^rly u.nbcliev-
n.blG»
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fR i t t e r «s Dcfonse
R i t t e r farther plcciy in sabstr.ncG to tho
effect thr.t ho ho.d cfficinlly nethin^ to cLc with the
drafting of the rexDly-note end thr.t ho rdvised Albrocht
in this rospGot only out of courtesy towrrd r Poroign
Office Gollergue (Trrnscript prge 11934), is even on its
free utterly incredible in view of his position es top
lirison ar.n between Foreign Office and Ar^y High Goninand,
This particular natter was oerta-inly one of those falling
within the scope of his liaison activities. Moreover,
his plea, is directly refuted by a. nunber of docunents,
as for insto-nce his nonorandun, dated 5 June 1944, on
Keitel's approval of tho draft (Exhibit 1282, NG-3901,
I)oo»B. 40, Engl«P»2)3 tho passage -'upon instructions Xron
Anbassador R i t t e r" in Vogel's file note of 25 May
1944 (Exhibit 12€4, hG—2318, Eoc«E.40, Engl.p.6);
finally the noncrandua by Brenner of 17 July 1944 (Exh.
1284, hG-2318, Dec.B.40, Engl,p»7), containing Ribbentrop*s
roqucst, addressed to R i t t e r, to pass cn to the
Swiss envoy the second Gcrnan reply.
The Sagan incident had an cftornath in the fern of
r achene to ostrblish so-called death zones and the
respective warning was drafted by R i t t e r, a.s a.pp^-'r»-
fron parts of Exhibit 1284, HG-2318, I)cc,B.40, Engl. pe.gcs
7-lO« Rroeecut.ion*s theory concerning this warning
correctly stated by the following quosticn of R i -
^ r >s defonsG counsel;
"how, Mr. R i t t e r, it is iapcrtant to
ne to find out what you thought about the
, pose of this warning. The prosecution is
io paint the picture as if this warning was
aorely an excuse so that in the c-se of any fu
ture slioctinas of prisoners of war there night
be available^'a better alibi as e.g. in the case
cf tho Sagan incident." (Transcript page1196o).
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R i t t e r, of course, clr.ias the reol purpose
of the vjorriin-^ wn.e idGntior.l vvith its apparent one (Ibid)«
It is net neoossc.ry to elr.borotc cii -b^e side-issue» The
obvious connection between this new venture in bKo field
of utrocitios cgoinst prisoners of wr..r ond the
dent is obvious froa Exhibit i284 (NG-23n8, Roc.B.40,
EnSl. P#. 7), in spito ofRittor 's o,tteapt to refute
such connection, rr.thox to ropresont thr.t "warning" as a
separ.-te and innocent natter. No unbiased reader of the
docunents in question will fail to see in this death-zones
J scher-ie just a-nother technique for a pseudo—legal cover—up
of other planned aurders. There was a-lso in this ugly
^ natter fine cooperation between Arny High Oonnand aJid
Foreign 'Office through R i t t e r as liaison nan, as
ap'pears fron his following note to Albrocht of 5 August
1944, Exh. 1284 (Nd-a^lS, Boo.Eo 40, Engl. p.8)s
"The enclosed version cf the 'warning' has
now been aqiiprovod by the Reich Minister for Foreign
Affairs and the 0IG7, The ;7ohrnacht operations
staff is new xJassing tho v;arning to the propaganda
Section of the 0IC7 for translation. T/hen the
^ "translation is oonpleted, copios cf the warning
will bo given to the prisonors-of-wax section or_^
> the ^010.7 for distribution tc tho c"nps. The ForeignOffice has net yet ocnnunicatod this vr'xning to
Jho Swiss Gcvoxnnont. The tine cf this connunica-
« tion riust coincide with tho tine of the x^asting
of the vj^rning in the caps, I xoquost you to
? Contact tho prisonors-of-7/^x secticn of "bho 0^7
with rogTd to this tiac "nd xeconnend tln^t the
wording cf r note to tho Swiss G-overnnenf bo sud-
'_r^"tted to the Reich Minister for Foreign Affao-^s
? approval a few d^ys in advnoo, so th" t theto is disx)'^tGhed as soon a.s possible a-ftcr the
warning has been p;:stcd in the oa.npsB"
i t t G r 's contenpcranoous st^te cf a-ihd con'-
ccrning the Sagan affahr, na.nely th^-t he was not a,t a.ll
conceined about its tragic human asxioot, only
X^rovent the ugly truth from being r:fficia.lly adnitbed, _
is illustr-tcd by th-t part of Exh. 1284, {HG-231 8, '_Dog*
Tj, 40, En-gl, pages 12-21) vifhich includes a rienor a.nduri
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on CL OonferGncG of the prisoner of 'Jrx Service, on
21 Noveabor 1944, under the chr.irar.nship of its Chief,
Minister Dr• .Tindeckor. in rendering r. speech ar-de by
Senior Legation Councillor Reinhard (of the prisoners of
v/ar Service), the neaorandua contains the following
passage;
"Therefore, such occurrences as in Canp
Sagan, in which 50 officers were shot after-
having Dade an attempt to escaiDe, a.re extremely
regrettable." (Doc.B.40, Engl.i^.lS).
Upon reading this memorandum, Hitter, in his
own written comment, of 8 December 1944, made a remark
which reveals the cold cynicism cf a professicnal
criminal who complains about the lack of caution of his
follow gangsters. He wrote, referring to the passage,
regretting the shootings;
"The sentence on page 8, *Therefore, such
occurrences as in Camp Sagan in which fifty of
ficers "were shot after having made an attempt to
escape, are extremely regrettable', should net
have been written into a. document which is not
being treated as top secrete"
(pros .Dxh, 1284, NG-2318, Doc»}3o40,Engl .p^ge 21).
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^• H I T T E E ^ S pr.rticipr^.tion in the Mui'der of the
ExencE G-onorrl LIESEY.
The defendant R i t t e x pnxdlclpr.-tcd in the
schoQG fox tliG auxdex of c- Exench Gcnexr.l which wns, by
the nuxder of G-enexr^l Hosny, perx^Gtrotcd on 19 Jr.nanry
1945 (prceecuticn Exhibit 1248, PS-4069, Doc.Booh 42,
En^xl. pr.£;e 11), r.ftor the Dost cynior..! end cold-bloodod
pxopox-ticn by the Eoxcifin Office, the P w nccncy end
the RSiiA.. EcfoxGnce to this mr.ttor is ccntrined in tv/o
possn^es of the IMT jud^aent, quctod hercinnbove in the
Introduction, nrncly in the findinps rcepoctively con-
oorninp von Eibbentxop end Koltenbramic-r. In the pxosont
G^se, the cffrrix nppoors thus ncntionod in the opening
strtcQont of the Prcsocuticns
"Equally diec^^Gceful wr^s the brutr^l rnd
senseless aurdox zf the Ercnch G-cnorr.l Mesny, a
pxisonox of wax in Goraon custody, in which the
defendant Bor,qex w^s deeply involved end which,
acr.in, the Sefend'-ntE Stcenyxr.cht and R i t t o r
hcIpGd to cover up and conceal," (Opening
st'-^toacnt page 37)«
The defendant E i t t e x, at the end of his direct
Gxaninaticn on Count Jll, upon the question;
"Y/hen did you hear for the first t ir.io that
a Eronoh gcnoxal had been murdcrod and wlxat was
5''our reaction?";
gave this answer;
"Br, ICor.ipnor told r.ic thot at ay first inter
rogation and r.iy opinion is that of Hitler's aany
this nurdor, because of the refinenent ofG-ts prox)aration and its coaplcto senselessness,
soeas to qg to bo one of the r.iost horrible» I
deeply iw.'jret th"t G^^raany's none had been bo—
snirehod with such criaes,"
ITr.-nscxipt payo 12000),-
G^ho Gvidenco, however, shows that the G^raan
Eoroi^n Office, with active particixoaticn of R i t t e f,
li^-.-j-^on diploa'^ t with the Ixay High Coonand, knevj in
arlvance about, consented to and cooperated with the plan
ning aird subsequent covering up of that most her rible
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The pertinont evidence consists of docuaents nnd
nffidpvits. Str.rtinrj with the dooarients, we first turn
to pnrt of Prosecution Exhibit 1249 (Na-037, Poc.B, 42,
Encl^ P* 15)j r. aenorrndua doted 16 IToveaber 1944, signed
by R i t t e r end c.ddressed to Senior Logotion Council--
lor V/agnerj then Chief of Departaent inland II of the
Poroign office, of the following contents?
"To avoid uncertainty, I once acre wish to
state in v.'riting, that the Reich Foreign Eiinistcr
instructed ae on Sa.turda.y 11 Noveaber, tc pa.ss on
to you the charge of ensuring that nothing should
happen in the Bro (ErodowskiJ aattor, before the
Reichsfuehror-SS or the SB ha-s agreed with you
a.bout t?ie aoda.lities and possible later aannor of
reporting, I was a-ble to pa.ss cn this instruc
tion tf; you on Sunday, 12 Rovonbcr, at 1730 hours#
"The instructions arc therefore addressed
to ycu and not to ae# I have aerely been instruct
ed b^/" the Reich Foreign Minister to pass the in--
structicns on to youo The Roich Foreign Minister
also told ae to. see that the instructions be dui^y
carried out."
In his tcstiaony on direct, the defendant attcapt-
ed to give to this docuaent a aeaning which would fall
in line with liis defense in substance to the effect tha.t
in thi'3 natter he a^ctod nerely as a. acssenger between
Ribbor.trop and Wa.gncr# Said hes
". «a • I was just passing on Rlbbentrop'^
order to hia a-nd had nothing to do with the hmO-'-
ling of the ca.so," (Transcript page 11984)^
This pl.ea which would not free hin froa criminal guilt
even if it were true, is ncreover, inconsistent with the
following passage of the abovequoted docuaents
"The Roich Foreign Minister also t old
to sec that the instructions do duly ca.rr red P
This cloarly shows that it fell within R i t t e r »s
resptjnsibility to supervise yagnor's respective activity.
That he was carrying out this instruction, appears froa
other documents and from pertinent affidavits cited in
- 40 -


























